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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.'' Does the Subpoena Powers Act violate the due process clause of the Utah Constitution by granting to prosecutors
the unbridled power to subpoena witnesses and conduct secret
interrogations without

establishing

any standards to protect

against abuse?
2.

Does

the Subpoena

Powers Act,

by

creating

an

investigative procedure with all of the powers of the grand
jury and none of the protections, violate individual constitutional

rights,

including

the

right

to

be

warned

against

incriminating oneself, the right to be advised of the nature
and scope of the investigation and the right to be informed
that counsel may be present during questioning?*
3.

Does

the

Subpoena

Powers

Act,

by

granting

unbridled discretion to the prosecutor to conduct grand jury
type proceedings in secret, violate the constitutional requirement that there be a separation of powers among the branches of
government?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The constitutional and statutory provisions relied on
by respondent Emery Mining Corporation are set forth in Appendix "A" hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from a final Order of the Seventh
Judicial District Court of Emery County dismissing a criminal

investigation

and

declaring

unconstitutional

the

Subpoena

Powers Act, Utah Code Ann, S 77-22-1 et. seq. (1982) (sometimes
referred to hereinafter as the •Act" or the "Subpoena Powers
Act".). (R. at 734)
is attached

hereto

(A copy of Judge Boyd Bunnell's decision
as Appendix

"B".)

The district

court's

decision came in response to respondents1 constitutional challenges to the Subpoena Powers Act and the actions of the Attorney General under authority of that Act,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During its 1980 Budget Session, the Utah State Legislature re-codified Utah's criminal procedure statutes.

As part

of that re-codification, the Legislature amended the Subpoena
Powers Act so as to virtually eliminate judicial control over a
prosecutor's use of the courts' subpoena power.

(Tr. of Legis-

lative Debates, H.B. No. 32, Jan. 19, 1980 at pp. 5-6). (R. at
318).

Under the amended Act, a prosecutor need no longer pre-

sent a court with good cause for the issuance of each subpoena.
Rather, a single good cause showing, if approved by the court,
entitles a prosecutor to conduct an investigation during which
he may issue subpoenas and take testimony in secret, both without judicial supervision.
On

January

Office initiated

26,

1983,

the

Utah

Attorney

General's

such an investigation

upon approval of the

Seventh District Court for Emery County.

(R. at 8). The court

also granted the Attorney General's request that the investiga-

-2-

tion be subject to a secrecy order.

(R. at 3). The investiga-

tion was authorized on the basis of an affidavit submitted by
Wayne I*. Wickizer, an investigator for the Attorney General's
Office.
tions,

The affidavit, consisting primarily of hearsay allegaasserted

that

UP&L

and

Emery

Mining

officials

had

engaged in misconduct during the period from September 14, 1981
through March

19, 1982.

(R. at

5)

(Due to

a continuting

secrecy Order, a copy of the affidavit is not attached hereto,
but appears separately as Appendix "C").
The Attorney General's Office began issuing subpoenas
in the name of the Seventh District Court to various individuals, including non-targeted third parties.
at pp. 5-6).

(Appellant's Brief

Because of the secrecy order and the Attorney

General's refusal to identify those served, it is still unknown
exactly to whom and for what purpose most of the subpoenas were
served.

(R. at 745). Each of the respondents to this appeal

was served with
enforceability

a subpoena and

thereof.

(R.

subsequently

at

9,

62-135,

challenged

the

212, 220-232,

255-339, 607, 633-651).
Emery Mining, one of several respondents herein, is a
closely

held

corporation

which

operates UP&L's

properties as an independent contractor.

coal mining

The subpoena duces

tecum served on Emery Mining, dated May 16, 1984, was directed
to the "custodian of records" and commanded production of:
records which identify all officers, directors, consultants and employees (both union
and non-union, professional and mining) of
-3-

Emery Mining for the period 1979 to the
present.
Such shall include, but not be
limited to, names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates of employment and employee numbers, if known.
(A copy of the subpoena is attached as Appendix "D".)

The sub-

poena specifically stated that it was issued by order of the
district

court

and

that failure to obey the subpoena would

result in punishment for contempt of court.

(R. at 651-52).

Emery Mining requested, but never received, information about
the nature of the investigation and whether
owners were targets of the investigation.

its officers or

(R. at 640).

Respondents UP&L, Maxfield, Stott and Colby were the
first

to challenge

motions to quash.

to Attorney

General's

(R. at 57, 62).

subpoenas

through

During a hearing on the

motions held on May 30, 1984, the Seventh District Court voiced
concern about the constitutionality

of the Act, particularly

with respect to the Act's lack of procedural safeguards.
of Hearing May 30, 1984 at pp. 43-44, 68).

(Tr.

Notwithstanding

those reservations, the district court denied the motions to
quash, but imposed conditions on the prosecutors use of the
subpoena

power.

individuals

be

These
warned

conditions
whether

required

they

were

that

subpoenaed

targets

of

an

investigation, informed of their right to counsel and advised
of the nature and scope of the investigation. Ij3.
Shortly thereafter, respondents UP&L, Maxfield, Colby
and Stott filed motions to reconsider.

(R. at 255). At about

this time, respondents Fletcher, Thompson, Ziemski and Conklin,

-4-

who had already been charged criminally, filed motions seeking
access to certain information developed during the investigation, and joined the motions to reconsider*

(R. at 383-86)•

In response to this second attack on the Act's constitutionality, the Attorney General1s Office withdrew all outstanding subpoenas with the exception of the yet unchallenged
subpoena directed to Emery Mining.

(R. at 381-82).

The Attor-

ney General then argued that since the subpoenas had been withdrawn, the constitutional

challenges

to the Act were moot.

(Tr. of Hearing, Sept. 12, 1984 at p. 87).

Apparently the

Attorney General opened a new investigation in Salt Lake County
at about this time.

(R. at 382). From the record it does not

appear that the Third District Court knew or had any way of
knowing about the constitutional challenges leveled at the Act,
or

about

the

restrictions

imposed

by Judge

Bunnell

on the

Attorney Generalfs use of the subpoena power.
On August 21, 1984, Emery Mining joined those challenging the Act by moving to quash its subpoena.

Following a

hearing held on September 12, 1984, the Seventh District Court
quashed the subpoena served on Emery Mining and allowed those
respondents charged criminally in the Fifth Circuit Court to
examine the Attorney General's "good cause" affidavit.
Hearing, Sept. 12, 1984 at p. 123).
court

(Tr. of

Several days later, the

issued a memorandum opinion finding

that the Attorney

General1s Office had engaged in a course of unrestrained abuse

-5-

as a result of the Act's lack of standards and declaring the
Act unconstitutionally vague.
ing, the court dismissed

(R. at 734). Based on its rul-

the criminal

investigation

and the

Attorney General filed this appeal.
Respondents filed motions with this Court seeking to
supplement

the record

review all subpoenas

on appeal by including

issued by the Attorney General

course of the criminal
strenuously

resisted

for jji camera

investigation.

these motions

and

in the

The Attorney General
this Court

took the

matter under advisement pending receipt of the parties' briefs
on the merits.

The Attorney General admits in his brief, how-

ever, that numerous subpoenas were served

on third parties.

(Appellant's Brief at pp. 5-6). Respondents, as well as this
Court, are presently without means to review the scope of those
subpoenas.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
An important

aspect of the due process doctrine of

vagueness is that a legislature must establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement agencies in their administration

of

criminal

statutes.

Few

governmental

powers

demand

closer scrutiny and stricter controls than the power of compulsory process, especially where coupled with the opportunity for
secret interrogations and the power to criminally charge.
the Subpoena

Powers Act

contains

virtually

no standards to

guide prosecutors in their exercise of these vast powers.

-6-

Yet

In

addition, the Act
secret

removes the court

interrogation

process,

thus

from

the

severely

subpoena

and

restricting

the

capability for judicial supervision over a prosecutorfs use of
these powers.
The lack of standards to guide prosecutors invites
abuse; the removal of judicial supervision
occur.

allows abuses to

The power to conduct entire investigations, including

secret interrogations, results in the potential for undetectable prosecutorial abuse.
Examples of the known abusive conduct engaged in under
the Act by the Attorney General in the present case include
issuing subpoenas which exceeded the scope of the investigation, conducting overlapping investigations and forum shopping.
Under the Act, prosecutors frustrated witness1 rights to challenge subpoenas, precluded the authorizing court from reviewing
subpoenas issued in its name and used subpoenas to gather evidence after charges had been filed.

Evidence obtained pursuant

to the investigative power was improperly

utilized

in civil

proceedings by prosecutors acting in both civil and criminal
proceedings.
denied
their

On

the

other

access to evidence
defenses

discuss

their

and

hand,
necessary

subpoenaed

testimony

with

counsel.

-7-

criminal
for

witnesses
criminal

defendants

were

the preparation of
were

told

defendants

not
or

to

their

The Subpoena Powers Act creates a "one-man grand jury"
by vesting in a prosecutor

the power to subpoena witnesses,

grant immunity and act in secret.

The Act grants to the prose-

cutor all of the powers of a grand jury, but provides for none
of the safeguards.

The Act eliminates the presence of an inde-

pendent arbiter, while neither on its face nor in its application does the Act provide the mandatory procedural protections
to which subpoenaed individuals are entitled under Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and this Courtfs decision
in State v. Ruggeri,

infra.

These protections

include the

right to be warned against self-incrimination, the right to be
advised of the nature and scope of the investigation and the
right to the effective

assistance

of counsel, particularly

during questioning.
Finally, the Act allows an unrestricted exercise of
the judicial subpoena power by an executive officer in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT VIOLATES THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
A.
Due Process Requires Statutes to Contain Appropriate Standards to Guide Law Enforcement Personnel.
The Utah Constitution, as well as the United States
Constitution,

declare

that

"No person

shall be deprived of

life, liberty or property without due process of law."

-8-

Utah

Const. art* I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. 5.
process

includes

the

requirement

that

The concept of due

governmental

entities

charged with enforcing the law be guided in their actions by a
set of reasonable standards.

The United States Supreme Court

recently emphasized that fact in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 75 L.Ed. 2d 903 (1983), wherein it stated:
Although the [vagueness] doctrine focuses
both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary
enforcement,
we
have
recognized
recently that the more important aspect of
vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but
the other principle element of the doctrine the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,
(citation omitted)
Where the legislature
fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit "a standardless
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to pursue their personal predilictions.
461 U.S. at

, 75 L.Ed.2d at 909, quoting Smith v. Goguen,

415 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1974) (Emphasis added).
The Subpoena Powers Act fails to provide the minimal
standards necessary to guide prosecutors in their use of powers
granted under the Act.

The 1980 amendment to the Act elimi-

nated the only judicial restrictions on a prosecutor's use of
these powers.

First, the amendment eliminated court approval

of the issuance of subpoenas and vested absolute control in the
prosecutor.

Under the original Act as adopted in 1971, sub-

poenas were issued only "upon application and approval of the
district court for good cause shown, . . . ."
§ 77-45-20 (1953).

Utah Code Ann.

Under the Act as amended, a court, in whose

name and under whose authority the subpoenas are issued, is
removed from the subpoena process once a criminal investigation
is authorized.
Second,

the

1980

amendment

eliminated

the

court's

ability to supervise the taking of testimony in secret.

The

original version of the Act provided that upon written application by a prosecutor, the district

court could

"order that

interrogation of any witness shall be before a closed court;
that such proceeding be secret; and that the record of such
testimony be kept secret unless and until the court for good
cause otherwise orders."

I<&.

(Emphasis added.)

The amended

Act allows the prosecutor to take testimony in secret without
the supervision and protection of the court.

Utah Code Ann.

S 77-22-2(3) (1982).
Unless challenged by a recipient of a subpoena, the
only restriction on a prosecutor's use of the subpoena power is
his own determination of what may be "relevant."
Ann. S 77-22-2(1) (1953).

Utah Code

Because of the elimination of judi-

cial supervision, a subpoenaed witness1
only by the prosecutor's conscience.

rights are protected

Due to its lack of stan-

dards to guide prosecutorial conduct, the Act is susceptible to
a wide variety of potential abuses.

The record in this case

demonstrates that many of the potential abuses actually occurred.

-10-

B.
The Act Does Not Include Any Means of Determining
Whether a Prosecutor is Exceeding the Scope of the Authorized
Investigation.
1.
Once authorized, an investigation is subject only
to the prosecutor's determination of relevance.
Once
application

a

to

district
conduct

court

an

has

investigation

court is removed from the picture.
poenas are not approved
and

filed

whether

after

the

bear

court

any

a

under

prosecutor's
the

Act,

the

Since the individual sub-

by the court

service,

the subpoenas

granted

in advance nor
has

relevance

scope of the authorized investigation.

no

way

of

returned
knowing

to the purpose

and

The only limitation on

a prosecutor is his own discretion as to what may be relevant.
The Act allows a prosecutor to intrude into the private affairs
of every citizen with no limitations save the prosecutor's conscience.
In the present
poenas duces tecum

case, certain

of the challenged

indicate the manner

in which

sub-

the Attorney

General exceeded the authorized scope of the investigation.
(a)
served

The

Emery

Mining

on Emery Mining commanded

Subpoena,

its custodian

The

of records to

produce:
records which identify all officers, directors, consultants and employees (both union
and non-union, professional and mining) of
Emery Mining for the period 1979 to present.
Such shall include, but not be limited to,
names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates of
employment and employee numbers, if known.

-11-

subpoena

(R. at 641; See Appendix

"D* hereto).

This subpoena exceeded

the scope of the investigation authorized by the court in two
ways.

First,

requested

the

grossly

time

period

exceeded

for

the

which

time

Attorney General in its application
tion.

Second, the subpoena

the

period

information
targeted

to conduct

demands production

with respect to all employees of Emery Mining.

by

was
the

the investigaof

information

This includes

everyone from the lowest custodians and miner1s helpers to the
President of the company.

It also includes thousands of rank

and file miners who worked during that five-year period.
request

This

is well outside the scope of the investigation autho-

rized by the court.
(b)
information

The

relating

Colby
to

and

uranium

Stott

subpoenas

properties.

requesting

The

Attorney

General served subpoenas on respondents Colby and Stott demanding detailed information concerning UP&I/s dealings in uranium
properties.

(R. at

171, 173).

Judge

Bunnell

recognized

the

overbreadth of the subpoenas, stating:
A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General's office attempted to get into
Utah Power and Light Company's dealings in
uranium mining, when in fact the original
Good Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication
of any criminal dealings in this area.
(Memorandum Decision Relative to Constitutionality at p.2)

(R.

at 735).
(c)

Subpoena

to

Newell

Johnson,

CPA.

A

third

example of the abuse which resulted under the Act is reflected
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by the subpoena served on respondent Mike Thompson's accounting
firm ordering the production of the following:
[A]ll books, records, papers of any kind
relating to Mike Thompson and Associates,
Guardex, Alarmex, Vanguard, Mike Thompson,
individually;
Mike
Ziemski,
individually;
Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy Bowman,
individually;
and
all
other
individuals
and/or entities associated therewith.
(R. at

223)

(Emphasis

added).

This subpoena

is so broad

it

would have commanded the production of the personal records of
Thompson's

attorney

if

he

had

employed

the

same

accounting

firm. (Tr. of Hearing, Sept. 12, 1984 at p. 47).
These

three

examples

came

to

the

district

court's

attention only because they were challenged by the recipients.
Due to the secrecy Order and the Attorney General's resistance
to filing
torial

all

abuse

issued
in this

subpoenas, the
investigation

full

extent

is unknown.

of

prosecu-

The Attorney

General's reluctance to allow this Court to review the unchallenged subpoenas prompts the inference that they are similarly
abusive.

This

conclusion

is

not

particularly

surprising

in

light of the fact that at least some of the subpoenas appear to
have been drafted by the investigator, Wayne Wickizer, rather
than by attorneys in the Attorney General's Office.

(See Tr.

of Darcie White depo., p. 4 ) .
2*
Due to the Generic Nature of the Investigation
Authorized under the Act, Overlapping Investigations could be
Opened in Separate Counties.
The Act authorizes a prosecutor to conduct an investigation by subpoenaing witnesses and conducting secret examina-13-

tions anywhere within his

jurisdiction which, in the case of

the Attorney General, is statewide.
may,

as

he

did

investigation
activity

here,

receive

from

one

court

throughout

the

entire

Thus, the Attorney General

authorization
and

proceed

state.

If

to

conduct

to

the

an

investigate

prosecutor

is

challenged in the authorizing district court, he can, under the
veil of secrecy, do as he has done here and simply move to a
new district court, obtain identical authority

to conduct

same investigation, and continue with the investigation
challenged
strated

again.

The significance of this problem

in the present

case where the Seventh

the

until

is demon-

District

Court

was only able to see the full pattern of prosecutorial abuse as
a

result

of

cumulative

challenges

over

a

period

of

several

months.
Under
authorized
rence.

the Act as adopted

and

Each

issued

subpoena

showing of good cause.

as an
was

in 1971, each

isolated

justified

and

subpoena was

independent

occur-

on the basis of its own

For this reason, there was little like-

lihood of overlapping requests before different courts.

Simi-

larly, there was no need for a reviewing court to look beyond
the subpoena and its good cause showing to determine whether it
was abusive.
The problem of overlapping

investigations is exempli-

fied by the Attorney General's actions in the present case.

In

response to the motions to quash and constitutional challenges
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leveled at the Act in the Seventh District Court, the Attorney
General's Office withdrew the subpoenas issued in the name of
that court and argued that the challenges to the subpoena power
were

thereby

General

rendered

apparently

Lake County.

moot.

opened

Simultaneously,

an

identical

the

Attorney

investigation

in Salt

Due to the secrecy Order in place, the Salt Lake

County District Court had no knowledge, and no means of obtaining

knowledge,

of

the

events

which

had

transpired

in

the

Seventh District Court.
C.
The Secrecy Provision of the Act Restricts the
Ability of the Court to Review the Use of its Subpoena Power
and Prevents the Effective Assistance of Counsel.
1.
Unless
challenged,
reviewed by the court.

the

subpoenas

The Act contains no requirement
by a prosecutor

be submitted

to a court

for

review prior

to

and filed with the

Unless challenged, the court has no way of

knowing what is being done under its name and authority.
when a particular

never

that subpoenas issued

service or that the subpoenas be returned
court once served.

are

Even

subpoena is challenged, the court is unable

to see how it fits into the overall pattern of the investigation.
By way of example, the Attorney
ously resisted

respondents1

General

has strenu-

requests that the other

subpoenas

issued during the investigation be filed with the court for an
in camera review.

Judge Bunnell was never given the opportun-

ity to inspect the other subpoenas and later ruled that he had
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no authority under the Act to require the Attorney General to
present the court's own subpoenas for review. (See Appendix "E*
attached hereto).

As of the present, the other subpoenas are

not part

record

of

this

although

the Attorney

General

described some of them in some detail in his brief.

has

(Brief of

Appel- lant at pp. 5-6).
2*
The secrecy provision of the Act
danger of inconsistent rulings by courts.

increases the

As discussed abovey the Act does not protect against
overlapping investigations.

Because of the secrecy provisions

of the Act, it is entirely possible that two separate district
courts could issue contradictory rulings on the interpretation
or validity
aware

of

of certain

the

other's

subpoenas or practices and never be
ruling.

This

ability

to proceed

in

several jurisdictions also infringes on the right of appeal to
this Court.

Utah Const, art. VIII, S 9.

For example, on May 30, 1984, in response to motions
to quash filed by respondents UP&L, Maxfield, Colby and Stott,
the Seventh District Court expressed substantial reservations
about the Actfs constitutionality and upheld the Act only by
reading into it certain procedural safeguards.

(Tr. of Hear-

ing, May 30, 1984 at p. 68). When the Attorney General opened
a new investigative proceeding in Salt Lake County later that
year, there was no way for the Third District Court to know of
Judge Bunnell's ruling.
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3#

The Act allows prosecutorial "forum shopping,"

Although the ability of the courts to review the use
of their subpoenas is limited under the Act to those occasions
where particular subpoenas are challenged, the Attorney General
takes the position that he may divest the courts of even that
limited power of review.

Nothing in the Act precludes a prose-

cutor from withdrawing a subpoena once it is challenged and
moving the investigation to a different district court.

Like-

wise, if upon challenge a court imposes conditions on the exercise of the subpoena power, the prosecutor can simply move to
another county, open an investigation and proceed anew.
new court would be unaware of either

The

the challenge or the

adverse ruling because of the secrecy provisions of the Act.
Within the State of Utah, the Attorney General has a potential
of 29 different courts to which he can turn in hopes of obtaining

the

desired

"opportunity

ruling.

This

to challenge" that

significantly
the Attorney

diminishes

the

General argues

provides the necessary review and protection.
The Attorney General barely survived the first round
of

constitutional

Colby and Stott.

challenges

by

respondents

UP&L, Maxfield,

The Court expressed reservations about the

Act's constitutionality and imposed procedural restrictions on
the Attorney General's exercise of the subpoena power.

When

faced with a renewed and expanded attack, the State withdrew
its subpoenas and claimed that any constitutional challenges to
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the Act were moot.

The Attorney General hoped to remove juris-

diction from the judge who had already expressed grave concerns
about the Act's

constitutionality.

Then the Attorney General

opened a new, presumably identical, investigation in Salt Lake
County.

(R. at 380-81).

4.
The secrecy provision of the Act frustrates the
ability to effectively attack abusive conduct on the part of
prosecutors.
The secrecy provision of the Act and the lack of prior
judicial

review

subpoena

power

minimizes
will

be

the

likelihood

detected

that

abuses

or' effectively

subpoenas may

exceed

the

scope

of

the

the

challenged.

Subpoenas served on third parties, such as financial
tions and record custodians, are kept secret.

of

institu-

Even though the

investigation

or seek

privileged information/ there is little likelihood of challenge
since the third parties have no incentive

to do so.

As the

United States Supreme Court recently noted in a case involving
an

IRS summons, a third

summons

"might

vigorously.*
U.S.

have
Tiffany

party who

little
Fine

is not

incentive
Arts,

the target

to

oppose

Inc. v.

United

, 53 U.S.L.W. 4078, 4080 (1985).

of the

enforcement
States,

The Court went on to

state that in a situation where the IRS is not confronted by an
adversary, it "could use its summons power to engage in 'fishing expeditions1 that might unnecessarily trample upon taxpayer
privacy."

Id.
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The Attorney General's service of subpoenas upon nontarget, third parties under the Act gives rise to the same concerns and abuses*

While Congress has statutorily created pro-

tections against the IRS1 abuse of its summons power by either
allowing the targeted party notice and an opportunity to challenge the summons or requiring that a court exert a restraining
influence on the IRS, 26 U.S.C. S 7209, the Subpoena Powers Act
provides no opportunity to a targeted

individual

to challenge

third party subpoenas or, for that matter, to obtain notice of
subpoenas served on third parties*
The

Attorney

General

admits

that

as

part

of

its

investigation it has served numerous subpoenas on third parties
who are not targets of the investigation,
at pp. 5-6).

(Brief of Appellant

Since none of these third parties have come for-

ward to challenge the subpoenas, neither this Court nor respondents have any way of knowing to whom the subpoenas were issued
or what information was sought or received as a result.

The

secrecy provisions, both on their face and as applied, allow an
investigation

to

proceed

interrogation

of witnesses

in

secret

as

in secret.

well

as

allowing

The secrecy

the

provisions

also allow the prosecutor to keep from counsel for any witness
any facts about the nature and scope of the investigation and
the identity of its targets.

In other words, a witness may be

deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
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D.
The Act Allows for Continued Abuse Once Criminal
Charges Have Been Filed,
1.
A Prosecutor may continue to gather evidence by
means of subpoenas after criminal charges have been filed,
Utah's Subpoena Powers Act has somtimes been referred
to as the "mini-grand jury act" because of the powers it confers on the prosecutor.
(Utah 1981).

KUTVy

Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d

412

It is highly improper for a prosecutor in a grand

jury setting to continue to gather evidence by means of a grand
jury subpoena once an individual is charged.

United States v.

Doss, 563 F.2d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1977); See also United States
v. Santucci , 504 F.Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. 111. 1980).

Never-

theless, in the present case the Attorney General continued to
use subpoenas to gather evidence against several of the respondents even after criminal charges had been filed against them.
For

example,

the

subpoena

to

Mike

Thompson's

CPA,

discussed

above, was issued on May 14, 1984, several weeks after the complaint was filed in Fifth Circuit Court.
2.
The secrecy provisions of the Act allow a prosecutor to withhold evidence which would otherwise be discoverable by a criminal defendant.
Once

an

individual

is

charged

with

a

crime, he

is

entitled to discover certain information necessary to the preparation of his defense.
Typically

this

would

Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-16(5)

include

prior

statements

of

(1953).

witnesses,

People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 381 (Colo. 1982), and affidavits
filed by the State.

People v. Mendez, 28 App. Div. 2d 727, 281
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N.Y.S. 2d 608 (1967)•

Because of the Act's secrecy provisions,

however, a prosecutor is able to withhold such information from
a criminal defendant.
For

example,

after

charges

had

been

filed

against

several of the respondents herein, the Attorney General refused
to make available to them the Good Cause Affidavit upon which
the

criminal

disclosed

investigation

the

Affidavit

was

only

based.

when

The

ordered

Attorney
to

do

so

General
by

the

Seventh District Court.
3.
The Attorney General used the secrecy provisions
of the Act to prevent witnesses from talking to criminal defendants or their counsel.
In

the

course

of

their

secret

depositions

of

wit-

nesses, members of the Attorney General's Office told witnesses
that they were prohibited under the secrecy order from speaking
to anyone about

the questions

asked

and

answers

given.

For

example, in the secret deposition of Darcie White, the following statements were made:
[Mr. Olsen]

Mr. White, let me just remind you
of something that Steve may well
have talked to you about, but for
purposes of making sure that we're
clear on this, the proceedings here
are pursuant to an investigative
subpoena and are under a secrecy
order.
I would just remind you
that
the
proceedings
here,
the
questions, etc., are secret.
They
certainly may be discussed with Mr.
Nebeker but not with others.
The
other question I have is—well, let
me ask you if you understand that.
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MR. NEBEKER:

Let me ask you on what authority
you're telling him that he can't
discuss this with anyone

MR. OLSEN:

Pursuant to the secrecy order.
*

*

*

MR. NEBEKER:

Are you saying that this order says
that these people cannot talk to
anyone? Is that how you're interpreting this?

MR. OLSEN:

Well, I think with the exception of
the attorney, that is correct. I
don't know what the—

MS. DALLIMORE: Well, Steve, I think, at a minimum,
it would be better for everyone
concerned if a lot of people didn't
do a lot of talking to each other
about these proceedings and, specifically,
of
course,
if
Mr.
Fletcher called you on the phone,
don't you think it would be more
appropriate that it not be discussed?
(Tr. of Darcie White depo. at pp. 161-64). Although Mr. White's
counsel took exception to the Attorney General's admonition,
the prosecutors remained adamant.

Ij3. at 165.

Unrepresented

witnesses may have been examined on the most irrelevant and
even privileged matters and not come forward to disclose the
same because of the prosecutor's admonition.

This conduct is

improper and abusive in that it tends to "lock up" a witness'
testimony and prevents counsel for a criminal defendant from
effectively preparing a defense.

It also reduces the likeli-

hood that abusive practices of the prosecutor will be brought
to light and challenged.
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E.
The
Act
Contains
no
Standards
to
Prohibit
Improper Ose of Evidence Gathered in Criminal Investigations,
Because of the unrestrained control of the prosecutor
over use of the subpoena power and the cloak of secrecy which
envelops the investigation, the authorizing court has no means
of

ascertaining

used.

how

the

gathered

evidence

is

actually

Since the court has no means of knowing

being

to whom sub-

poenas have been served, it has no way of tracking either the
source of evidence or creating a record of the evidence itself.
In addition, it is impossible to determine whether the subpoena
power

in

the

criminal

investigation

is

also

being

used

to

gather evidence for use in civil or administrative proceedings.
The seriousness of that problem is even more acute where, as in
this case, the same attorneys for the State are involved in the
criminal, civil, and administrative aspects of a case.
The United States Supreme Court recently condemned the
use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain evidence for use in civil
actions
Inc.,

in

the

U.S.

case

of

United

States

v.

Sells

Engineering,

, 77 L.Ed.2d 743, 757 (1983), stating:

[Bjecause the Government takes an active
part in the activities of the grand jury,
disclosure to government attorneys for civil
use poses
a significant
threat
to the
integrity of the grand jury itself.
If
prosecutors in a given case knew that their
colleagues would be free to use the materials generated by the grand jury for a civil
case, they might be tempted to manipulate
the
grand
jury's
powerful
investigative
tools to root out additional evidence useful
in the civil suit, or even to start or continue a grand jury inquiry where no criminal
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prosecution seemed likely. Any such use of
grand jury proceedings to elicit evidence
for use in a civil case is improper per se«
(Emphasis added)•
The same attorneys from the Attorney General's Office
(notably

Ms.

Dallimore)

are

although related proceedings.

involved

in

three

separate,

In addition to its involvement

in the criminal investigation, the Attorney General1s Office
has been

involved

in

a proceeding

before

the Utah

Public

Service Commission involving allegations of misconduct on the
part of UP&L and Emery Mining.

The Attorney General's Office

has also been involved in a factually related civil anti-trust
case against those parties who have already been charged criminally as a result of this investigation.

It is unrealistic to

believe that these prosecutors can segregate in their minds
evidence obtained in the criminal proceedings from that gathered elsewhere.
P.
other State Subpoena Powers
Standards to Guide Prosecutorial Conduct.

Statutes

Provide

A survey of state statutes for provisions similar to
the Utah Subpoena Powers Act reveals that the few states granting investigative subpoena power to prosecutors have done so in
a manner which (1) preserves judicial approval or, (2) is not
subject to a secrecy provision.

No state subpoena power stat-

ute was found, other than Utah's, which gives the prosecutor
not only unbridled discretion in the use of the subpoena power,
but the right to request that the proceedings be held in secret.
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The Montana statute requires court issuance of each
subpoena upon a showing of cause, much the same as the Utah Act
prior to the 1980 Amendment.

Mont. Code Ann, S 46-4-301 (1983)

provides:
Whenever the attorney general or a county
attorney has a duty to investigate alleged
unlawful activity#
any Justice of the
Supreme Court or District Court Judge of
this state may cause subpoenas to be issued
commanding the persons to whom they are
directed to appear before the attorney
general or the county attorney and give
testimony and produce such books, records,
papers, documents and other objects as may
be necessary and proper to the investigation. A subpoena may issue only when it
appears upon the affidavit of the attorney
general or the county attorney that the
administration of justice requires it to be
issued. (Emphasis added).
The Montana statute further provides that if a subpoenaed witness does not have funds
justice

shall

appoint

to obtain

counsel

for

counsel, the
him.

Mont.

judge or
Code

Ann.

S 46-4-304 (1983).
The Louisiana statute also requires judicial approval
of each subpoena.

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Art. 66

(West Supp.

1984) provides:
Upon written motion of the attorney general
or district attorney setting forth reasonable grounds therefor, the court may order
the clerk to issue subpoenas directed to the
persons named in the motion, ordering them
to appear at a time and place designated in
the order for questioning by the attorney
general or district attorney respectively,
concerning any offense under investigation
by him. The court may also order the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. (Emphasis
added).
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In Utah,

a citizen

is faced with

a subpoena

that

appears to have been issued by the court when in fact it has
been issued by the Attorney General.

Arguably, a citizen will

be less likely to resist what appears to be a court-authorized
subpoena.

Under the Louisiana and Montana provisions, what the

citizen perceives

is indeed

the case,

i.e.,

authorized the issuance of the subpoena.
zen's natural

inclination

to comply

the

court

has

In short, the citi-

with

a court

order

is

justified.
Two other states also have statutes with respect to
investigative subpoenas.

Iowa Code S 813.2, Rule 5(6) (1979)

provides:
The clerk of the district court, on written
application of the prosecuting attorney and
the approval of the court, shall issue subpoenas including subpoenas duces tecum For
such witnesses as the prosecuting attorney
may require in investigating an offense
. . . . (Emphasis added).
Under

Kan.

Stat.

Ann.

§ 22-3101

application has been filed with a district

(1981),

after

an

judge requesting

authority to conduct an inquisition, "the judge with whom it is
filed shall, on the written praecipe of the attorney general,
assistant attorney general or county attorney, issue a subpoena
for the witnesses named

in such praecipe commanding

appear and testify . • . ."

them to

In addition to judicial involve-

ment in the issuance of subpoenas, the Kansas statute, unlike
the Utah Act, does not provide that the proceedings may be held
in secret.
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Only Delaware has an investigative

subpoena statute

similar to Utah's Act in that the attorney general alone is
authorized

to

issue

investigative

subpoenas.

The

Delaware

statute does not, however, provide prosecutors with a device
whereby interroga- tions can be conducted in secret.

See Del.

Code Ann. Title 29 S 2508 (1974) (See Appendix "A" hereto).
II.
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
DEFICIENT IN THAT IT FAILS TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
In KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, supra, 635 P.2d

412 (Utah

1981), this Court declared that the Subpoena Powers Act essentially created a "mini-grand

jury" by vesting in prosecutors

the power to subpoena witnesses and grant immunity, and the
ability to do so in secrecy.

A significant distinction between

the "mini-grand jury" created by the Subpoena Powers Act and a
grand jury convened under the direction and supervision of a
district court is that the Subpoena Powers Act vests in the
prosecutor virtually all of the powers of the grand jury, but
provides none of the procedural protections.
The grand jury is an extension of the court and stands
between the prosecutor and the accused or witnesses subpoenaed
to appear.

United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., supra, 77

L. Ed.2d at 752 (1983).

In other words, the grand jury acts as

a buffer between the one charged with the responsibility of
prosecuting and the one being prosecuted.

The Subpoena Powers

Act provides for no such buffer or protection.
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Notwithstanding the role of the grand jury as a buffer
between

the

prosecutor

and

Court found it important

those

appearing

to provide additional

witnesses in the grand jury setting.
Utah

2d 216, 429 P.2d

969

Justice

Ellett,

concurred

and

Justice

Henroid

by

before

(1967),
in by

by

this

safeguards for

In State v. Ruggeri# 19

in an opinion

Justice

means

it,

of

authored

Tuckett

a

by

specifically

separate

concurring

opinion, it was held that when a target of an investigation is
subpoenaed before a grand

jury he is an

"accused" within the

meaning of Utah Const, art. I, S 12 and is entitled to the protections guaranteed therein.

In Ruggeriy a county commissioner

was subpoenaed to appear before a grand
give testimony.

jury and compelled to

The witness was neither

informed

aware that he was a target of the investigation.
to

issues

addressed

appeal, a majority

in

Ruggeri

which

are

of the Court agreed

poenaed to appear before the grand

nor was he
With respect

pertinent

to

this

that any witness sub-

jury is in custody and is

entitled to the custodial interrogation warnings prescribed by
Miranda

v.

Arizona,

384

U.S.

436

(1966).

Justice

stated:
The target of an investigation is an accused
within the meaning of the Constitution and
when he is detained in any significant way,
he may not be interrogated unless he is
advised of the charges against him then under
consideration.
To fail to so warn one so
being investigated is to entrap him and to
violate his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.
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Ellett

19 Utah 2d at 223, 429 P.2d at 973.
An accused within the meaning of Utah Const, art. I,
§ 12 is entitled to be warned of his right against self incrimination, to be informed of the scope of the investigation and
to be advised of his right to have counsel present during the
interrogation.

This includes being informed that if he cannot

afford counsel, the court will appoint counsel for him.
The Attorney General acknowledges the absence of these
protections both in the literal language and in the application
of the Act.

The State seems to view

itself, however, as the

entity responsible for recognizing and protecting these rights.
According to an Assistant Attorney General:
The best that state prosecutors can do, at
this point, is to act in the way that seems
most fair, and that protects individual constitutional rights as they may appear.
(R. at 146).
In the instant

case, respondent

ped, much like the county commissioner
teering

testimony

without

having

been

Fletcher was entrap-

in Ruggeri, into volunwarned

target of the Attorney General's investigation.

that

he

was a

Additionally,

none of the employees of UP&L were informed whether they were
targets of the investigation
scope of the investigation
requested such information.

nor were they advised

although

their counsel

as to the
specificaly

(Tr. of Darcie White depo. at pp.

3-6).
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In sum, the Subpoena Powers Act frees the prosecutor
of

limitations

inherent

in the grand

jury system

and of the

restraining influence of the court's presence and allows him to
compel testimony in secret with only his conscience to protect
individuals1 rights.
III.
THE ACT CONTRAVENES THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE A SEPARATION OF
POWERS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.
The separation of powers doctrine contained in Article
V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any functions appertaining to either
of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted,
(Emphasis added).
With

regard

to

the

allocation

of

powers

among

the

branches of state government, this Court has declared:
The departments are all upon the same plane:
are all coordinate branches of the same
government; each absolute within its sphere,
except as limited or controlled by the Constitution of the State or of the United
States. The apportionment of distinct power
to one department
of itself
implies an
inhibition against its exercise by either of
the other departments.
Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 382-83, 57 P.l, 4
(Utah 1899) (Emphasis added).
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As discussed at length above, the Act vests in a prosecutor almost unchecked authority to subpoena witnesses and
take testimony in secret•

The subpoenas, although issued by

the Attorney General, bear the name of the district court and
indicate that failure to comply will result in being found in
contempt of court.

Once the investigation

is approved, the

district court is virtually powerless to supervise or review
the issuance of the subpoenas, unless a particular subpoena is
challenged.

Likewise, the court has no control over the inter-

rogation of witnesses conducted in secret.
Under the Act, a prosecutor is transformed into a oneman grand

jury.

KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, supra.

It is well

accepted, however, that the grand jury is merely an extension
of the court; that is, part of the judicial branch of government.

In re Moe, 617 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Hawaii 1980).

A prose-

cutor, on the other hand, is a member of the executive branch.
When acting as a one-man grand jury, the prosecutor impermissibly wears the hats of two branches.
In State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), this
Court declared it a violation of the separation of powers doctrine to grant the Attorney General power to add or delete substances

covered

by the Utah

Controlled

Substance

Court noted that such a grant of power placed

Act.

The

the Attorney

General, a member of the executive branch, in a position to
carry out functions properly vested in the legislative branch.
The Court stated:
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[T]he person, who is to be alert to possible
constitutional infirmities, is participating
in the legislative process by determining an
essential
element
of
a
crime
and
the
penalty. . . .
If Article V, Section 1, has any purpose it is to prohibit the concentration of
legislative and executive powers in one
person.
Id. at 686 (Emphasis in original).
respect to concentrating

The same could be said with

judicial and executive powers in one

person, as is the case under the Subpoena Powers Act.
Where a court authorizes, directs and controls the use
of its subpoena power, there exists no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah

587, 192 P.375 (Utah 1920).

Under the original Act, the dis-

trict court acted as a check on the prosecutor's powers.
the

amended

Act,

the

vesting

prosecutor's

court.

This

nothing

less than a grant

officer

and

is

of power

directly

of

in

in

conscience

the

conflict

replaces

prosecutor

judicial power
with

Under
the

constitutes

to an executive

the

separation

of

powers doctrine.
IV.
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.
Courts generally accord legislative enactments a presumption of validity.
1983).

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah

However, the presumption

is rebuttable and a court is

obligated to strike down legislative acts where "the interests
of justice in the particular

case before it require doing so
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because the act is clearly in conflict with the higher laws set
forth in the Constitution. "
(Utah

1981).

sonal

liberties,

Zamora v. Draper, 635 P. 2d 78, 80

Where a statute
as

is

the

encroaches

case

herein,

on fundamental perthe

presumption

of

validity is more easily overcome.
The legislative history behind the original Act indicates

that

judicial

considerable

supervision

emphasis

over

was placed

the subpoena

on

power.

the

need

for

Representative

Fisher, the sponsor of the original Act, proposed an amendment
to the Bill stating:
It is suggested that the subpoena power be
limited to approval of the district court
and so on line four, after the word "right11
"have the right", insert the word "upon
application and approval of the district
court for good cause shown."
(Tr. of House Debates on H.B. No. 121, March 10, 1971, p.5) (R.
at 292).

Representative Florence also expressed concern about

the potential for abuse absent court supervision:
I've had it expressed to my by a couple of
county attorneys that they are in favor of
this amendment not so much that they are in
fear of abuse by their own office, but it is
subject to possible abuse.
In a sense, it
involves a possible dragnet situation if we
allowed complete discretion with the prosecuting attorney to subpoena any person that
he may want even though that individual would
have to be given immunity prior to testifying
to any criminal implication.
It is still
something which delves upon an individual's
personal freedom and right to privacy and
there should be some limited area where a
person could, in fact, have this reviewable
by a judicial body based on probable cause so
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it cannot be a spurious subpoena to investigate into matters which totally are without
the realm of some criminal activity.
(Tr. of House Debates on H.B. No. 121, March 10, 1971, p.7) (R.
at 294).

Representative Fisher clearly indicated

that advance

judicial approval was necessary for the issuance of subpoenas,
stating:
Representative Mecham will remember that his
Ombudsman Bill was declared unconstitutional
because it gave no protection to the subpoena
power that the committee obtained under the
bill that we passed and, for that reason, the
court said it was not a constitutional Act;
at least in this instance.
Now, we have
required that these subpoenas be issued the
same as would a search warrant of a person's
home or search warrant of his car or his
person.
(Tr. of

House

Debates

on H.B.

No. 121, March

10, 1971, pp.

12-13) (Emphasis added) (R. at 299-300).
The legislative history behind the 1980 amendment does
not reveal any reason for the elimination of the judicial protections that had been of such concern to the enacting legislators.

The 1980 Legislature apparently thought it was simply

recodifying

the

criminal

procedure

code.

This

fact

is

reflected by statements made by Representative Livingston during debates on the redocification:
The Chief of Police of Provo . . . called and
asked for the status of House Bill 32 and
literally pleaded with me for the sake of his
local enforcement
that House Bill 32 be
passed and his comment is not far different
from those that I've related to you before
from County Attorneys, from judges and others
throughout
the state who have said
'The
Bill's not perfect, it's not the way that I
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would write it if I had the total authorship
but the need to have this occur is so great
and we are so hamstrung right now with the
confusion regarding the rules of the game,
the rules of procedure that we need this Bill
passed." . . • House Bill 32 is a lengthy
bill and I apologize to you for the length of
that particularity
in a budget
session
....
Let me point out that a third of
what is before you is already in the Utah
Code. It is simply reputting and reenacting
it.
(Tr. of Legislative Debates, H.B. 32, Jan. 19, 1980 at p. 2)
(Emphasis added) (R. at 315).
Representative Pox expressed concern over the passage
of such a massive and important bill during a budget session,
as follows:
I'm a bit concerned about the size of this
bill that we have before us in this very busy
budget session. It's 161 pages long. There
is some very subtle but very significant
changes that are being made in our criminal
code. I'm concerned that we as busy legislators haven't had the time to read all 161
pages and understand the changes . . . .
I
think there is no question that we need a
revision in our criminal code but I believe
that a revision should be done at a time when
we as a legislature have enough time to be
able to take a solid look at these changes,
at what these changes are going to mean.
Id. at 7 (Emphasis added) (R. at 320). The inference is clear
that

the

criminal

1980

Legislature

procedure

intended

statues,

rather

only

to

than

re-codify
make

the

sweeping

substantive changes which were in direct conflict with prior
legislative intent*
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Not only is the 1980 amendment in conflict with prior
legislative purpose, it also contravenes the "One Subject" rule
contained in Article VI, Section 22 of the Otah Constitution
since substantive changes were made during what was supposedly
a

re-codification.

For

these

reasons,

the

presumption

of

validity generally given to legislative enactments is seriously
eroded with respect to the 1980 amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Subpoena Powers Act ignores constitutional safeguards that were designed to protect individuals from abuses
which

may

occur

governmental body.

when

unbridled

power

is

given

to

any

Not only does the Act violate principles of

procedural and substantive due process, it also eliminates the
checks and balances constitutionally imposed between the executive and the judiciary.

The Act replaces the buffer of the

independent grand jury with the discretion of the prosecutor
and leaves to the conscience of the prosecutor the protection
of witness1

rights.

The

Seventh

District

Court's

decision

declaring the Act unconstitutional and dismissing the investigation should be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of Febr uary,

1985.

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
Emery Mining Corporation
185 South state Street, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT
84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT

EMERY

MINING

CORPORATION

to the following

day of February, 1985:
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Paul M. Warner
Assistant Attorney General
Robert N. Parish
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant
Donald B. Holbrook
Elizabeth M. Haslam
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Place
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
Stott, Colby & Maxfield
Stephen B. Nebeker
John A* Adams
P.O. Box 3850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850
Attorney for Respondent
Utah Power & Light Company
Sumner J. Hatch, Esq.
Hatch & McCaughey
72 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Max D. Wheeler, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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on this

ADDENDUM
Appendix "A*
U.S. Const, amend. 5:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private peoperty be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Utah Const, art. I. § 7:
No person shall be deprived of
property, without due process of law.

life,

liberty

or

Utah Const, art. I, S 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him, and to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Const, art. V, S 1:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to

one of these departments, shall exercise any function
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases
herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Const, art VI, S 22:
Every bill shall be read by title three separate times
in each house except in cases where two-thirds of the house
where such bill is pending suspend this requirement.
Except general appropriation bills and bills for the
codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be
passed containing more than one subject, which shall be
clearly expressed in its title. The vote upon the final
passage of all bills shall be by yeas and nays and entered
upon the respective journals of the house in which the vote
occurs. No bill or joint resolution shall be passed except
with the assent of the majority of all the members elected
to each house of the Legislature.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-45-20 (1953) (the Orignial Act):
Any matter involving the investigation of a crime, the
existence of a crime, or any criminal conspiracy or
activity the Attorney General, any district attorney or any
county attorney shall have the right, upon application and
approval of the district court for good cause shown, to
subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony
under oath before any certified court reporter, and require
the production of books, papers, documents, records and
other tangible items which constitute or may contain
evidence which is or may be relevant or material to the
investigation in the judgment of the Attorney General,
District Attorney or County Attorney.
The subpoena need not disclose the name or names of
possible defendants and need only contain notification that
the testimony of the witness is sought in aid of a criminal
investigation and state the time and place of the examination, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the attorney issuing the subpoena, and inform the
party served that he is entitled to be represented by
counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall be tendered and
paid as in any civil action.
In addition to the forgoing rights and powers to
compel attendance and obtain evidence, the Attorney
General, any District Attorney, or any County Attorney may
make written application to any district court and the

court may order that interrogation of any witness shall be
before a closed court; that such proceedings shall be
secret; and that the record of such testimony shall be keep
secret unless and until the court for good cause otherwise
orders. The court shall have the power to exclude from any
investigative hearing or proceeding, any and all persons
except the attorneys representing the state and members of
their staffs, court reporter, and the attorney for the
witness,
Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-2 (1982) (the Amended Act):
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of a
crime, the existence of a crime or malfeasance in office or
any criminal conspriacy or activity, the Attorney General
or any county attorney shall have the right, upon application and approval of the district court, for good cause
shown, to conduct an investigation in which the prosecutor
may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony under oath before any certified court reporter, and
require the production papers, documents, recordings and
any other items which constitute evidence or may be
relevant to the investigation in the judgment of the
Attorney General or county attorney.
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of
possible defendants and need only contain notification that
the testimony of the witness is sought in aid of criminal
investigations and state the time and place of the examination, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor using the subpoena, and inform the
party served that he is entitled to be represented by
counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a
civil action.
(3) The Attorney General or any county attorney may
make written application to any district court and the
court may order the interrogation of any witness shall be
held in secret; that such proceedings shall be secret; and
that the record of testimony be kept secret unless and
until the court for good cause otherwise orders. The court
may order excluded from any investigative hearings or
proceedings any persons except the attorneys representing
the state and members of their staffs, the court reporter
and the attorney for the witness.

Del, Code Ann. Title 29 S 2508 (1974):
(a) The
Attorney
General
or
any
assistant
may
administer oaths and affirmations to any person, including
witnesses, at any time or in any place and may issue
process to compel the attendance of persons, witnesses and
evidence at the office of the Attorney General or at such
other place as designated.
(b) The Attorney
General shall
transmit
to the
Prothonotaries of the counties of this State a certified
list giving the names and addresses of persons or witnesses
subpoenaed
under
this section, the time occupied
in
attendance and the distance traveled by them respectively.
The list shall be legal proof, and the same costs shall
accrue and be paid in the same manner as is provided by law
to be paid to witnesses for attendance at the courts of
this State.

APPENDIX "B

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY t
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
)

A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
RELATIVE TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY
CS NO- 1

On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held in this
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investigation proceeding.

The Court ruled from the bench on most

Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et seq.), authorizing
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by
other parties on a Motion to reconsider.
The Court previously considered the constitutional
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 30, 1984, and
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in
Its application the State Prosecutors comply with the following requirements:
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the
Act must be informed whether or not they are
targets of the investigation;

2. Such witnesses must be informed of
the nature of the matter under investigation
and the scope of the investigation;
3. Investigations conducted under the
authority of the Act must be limited to
criminal investigations within the parameters
of the initial good cause affidavit.
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity
to see the manner in which the Act has been applied and is
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the
personal rights of the citizens of this state.
For instance, the subpoena duces tecum served upon
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce:
"records which identify all officers,
directors, consultants and employees
(both union and non-union, professional
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period
1979 to the present. Such shall include,
but not be limited to, names addresses,
telephone numbers, dates of employment
and employee numbers, if known.11
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general
subpoena suppressed as being too broad in any investigation
of any criminal activity.
A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General's
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light Company's
dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the original Good
Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal dealings in this area.

The State withdrew this subpoena when

challenged in this court.
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Another subpoena issued out of this proceeding
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of
the following:
H

You are commanded to bring with you any and all
books, records, papers of any kind relating to
Mike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex,
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, individually; Mike Ziemski,
individually; Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy
Bowman, individually; and all other individuals
and/or entities associated therewith."

This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge in
this Court.
The deposition of L. Brent Fletcher,taken

pursuant

to subpoena issued under this investigative proceeding, did
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be
imposed to make the Act constituional in its application in
that the witness never was informed that he was a target,
nor as to the nature of the investigation and, because of
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the matter
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause
showing.

He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present

with him during these proceedings.
Some criminal charges have already been filed in Salt
Lake County based upon information obtained through this proceeding, and a civil anti-trust case has been filed in Salt Lake
County, also as a result of some of the information derived from
this investigative proceeding.

This investigative proceeding is
•3-

still open and being used for whatever purposes the State
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act,
without limitation as to when a criminal investigation
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of
the findings for civil purposes.
The Act has been abused and is subject to continued
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limitations upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their
subpoena power.

The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme

Court in its statement given in the case of In Re The Matter of
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows:
"When State action impinges on fundamental rights,
due process requires standards which clearly
define the scope of permissable conduct so as
to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights."
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act
is too vague and does not give proper protection to individual
-citizens against violation of their consti tuional right of
due process and protection against self-incrimination and
allows for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power
1s granted and finds the Act is unconstitutional.
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THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this
Criminal Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court.
DATED this . ^ % ^ d a y of September, 1984.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct
copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION RELATIVE TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY, by depositing the same in the United
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stanley H. Olsen, Esq.
David J. Schwendiman, Esq.
Suzanne M. Dallimore
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Stephen B. Nebeker, Esq.
John A. Adams, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 3850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Donald B. Holbrook, Esq.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Place
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Sumner J. Hatch, Esq.
HATCH & McCAUGHEY
72 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Max D. Wheeler, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110

DATED this 267r

John F. Clark, Esq.
SESSIONS & MOORE
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
F. Robert Reeder, Esq.
Francis M. Wikstrom, Esq.
Michael L. Larsen, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, Suite 70
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147

day of September, 1984.

APPENDIX "C"
Affidavit of Wayne L. Wickizer
(Copies of the affidavit were provided to the Justices
and

their

law clerks under separate cover so as not to

violate a continuing secrecy Order.)

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
STANLEY H. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-7627

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF A

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

CS NO. 1

THE STATE OF UTAH TO:

Custodian of the Records
Emery Mining Company
c/o Francis M. Wikstrom
185 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah
532-1234

You are hereby commanded to set aside all business
and excuses and appear at the office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah,
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., on Monday, the 25th day of June,
1984, to give testimony in support of a criminal investigation.

You are entitled to be represented by legal counsel.
You are also commanded to bring with you any and all
books, records, documents, accounts, or papers pertaining to:

Records which identify all officers, directors/
consultants and employees (both union and non-union, professional
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period 1979 to the present.
Such shall include, but not be limited to, names, addresses,
telephone numbers, dates of employment and employee numbers,
if known.
This Subpoena Duces Tecum is authorized by order
of the District Court.

Disobedience to this order is

punishable by contempt of Court.
Given under my hand this

1 (p'fk day of May, 1984.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division

By: .MA 1J f Q l ^
STANLEYJH. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
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APPENDIX "E"

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF A
CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION

)

ORDER ON MOTION TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

)
)
)

CS No. 1
The Movants, Karl J. Stott, Norman Maxfield and
Orrin T. Colby, Jr., have moved the Court for an order
compelling the State of Utah to answer certain interrogatories and to produce certain documents, to supplement the
record in aid of appeal in this case.

This Court has

previously declared the Statute that originated this proceed
ing to be unconstitutional and has in effect dismissed the
whole proceeding, and the State of Utah has filed its Notice
of Appeal of that decision.
When the Notice of Appeal is filed, the trial cour
in general terms, loses jurisdiction to take further action
the case except to take steps to see that the proper record
goes to the Appellate Court in accordance with Rule 75(h).
In the order requested, the applicant asks the Cou
to order the Attorney General's Office to file documents in
nature of the subpoenas that were issued by that office that

are not part of the records of this Court, and would never
become a record in this Court unless challenged by the party
to whom it was directed.
Since the matters asked for are not part of the
record and may never become part of the record in this Court,
and since the Court, under the Statutes in question, has no
authority to require the filing or production of subpoenas
issued by the Attorney General until contested, the Motion
must be denied.
The issuance, contents and matters covered, whether
within the perimeter of the Investigative Affidavit, are
entirely within the discretion of the prosecuting attorneys
and are not subject to any judicial control or prior review.
THEREFORE, this Court is of the opinion that it is
without authority to order production of the subpoenas requested
and is of the opinion that this is a further reason for declaring
the Statute unconstitutional.
DATED this

day of December, 1984.
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B0~YD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE
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236 State Capitol Building
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